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SHALL WE AMEND THE FiFTH AMENDMENT? By Lewis Mayers. Harper
& Brothers, New York: 1959. Pp. x, 341. $5.00.
This is a scholarly work analyzing the history of the privilege against
self-incrimination and its present judicial meaning. The title may mis-
lead, since it suggests a polemic for extensive amendment of a notable
constitutional provision. In fact no actual amendment is proffered.
Rather the book is an analysis of one only of the fifth amendment privi-
leges, and a critique of recent decisions which the author regards as
extending the privilege beyond historical bases and desirable policy, to-
gether with an argument for judicial retreat. As such the presentation is
doubtless more persuasive, even if less interesting, than would be a tract
fulfilling the promise of the title.
There are special merits in the detailed presentation. Particular men-
tion should be made of the careful analysis showing the present wide
use of the privilege to encompass matters not historically included
therein. Thus, as the author points out, there is today not a single privi-
lege, but the constitutional phrase is now held to embrace several distinct
rules of law, each having its independent development, with one group
relating to the accused, and another to the witness. The accused does
have an absolute right to refuse to testify at trial, as well as when before
a committing magistrate or the grand jury. A witness has no such right;
but, as developed from a different background, he may refuse to answer
incriminating questions-a right which may be abrogated by so-called
immunity statutes. Here the present congressional investigations have
given the privilege perhaps an unpleasant notoriety. Further, the wide
developments of the simple rule of waiver, visiting harsh results on
natural answers not made in contemplation of definitive waiver, have
tended to press the privilege unduly. But these may well be only tempo-
rary phenomena arising out of particular phases of congressional activity
and now already largely past.
In one chapter the author quite properly stresses the "Irrelevance of
History." Nevertheless his most persistent argument-that a witness en-
joys no constitutional privilege-is based upon his interpretation of history,
an interpretation which has now been consistently rejected by the
Supreme Court, by text writers, and by state courts construing analogous
state provisions.1 And this argument leads him to the conclusion that the
expanded privileges which he finds accorded a witness can and should be
curtailed without resort to constitutional change. This position he has
again advanced with further documentation in his article, The Federal
Witness' Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Constitutional or Common
Law? appearing in 4 American Journal of Legal History 107 (1960). He
is right in stressing the different rights and their differing origins of what
we now find covered generally by the constitutional provision; but his
1 See discussion and references in Professor McKay's perceptive review in 35
N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1097 (1960). Compare the review by Mr. C. Dickerman Williams in
28 Fordham L. Rev. 574 (1959), and that by Professor Nathanson in 108 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 1243 (1960).
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attempt at this late date to withdraw some of them from the constitu-
tional scope is hardly likely to succeed.
Notwithstanding the utility of this dissection and separate treatment
of all the privileges now held embodied in the fifth amendment, I must
confess that the total effect seems rather flat, if not dull. Actually the
parts of the argument seem distinctly better than the whole. And the
reason, I expect, is not far to find. It is that adverted to above, namely,
that the lively promise of the title is not fulfilled by the text itself. Not
without irony, which perhaps points a moral, is the fact that the author
never answers in so many words the question framed in his title. Seem-
ingly he has found it far from easy to tangle successfully with an import-
ant one of the Bill of Rights. His chief conclusion appears to be that the
courts have recently pressed the privilege too far, particularly in the case
of the witness, and that they should now retreat. But since they should
advance in other directions, notably in protection of the accused from
undue police questioning before arraignment or from harsh application
of the doctrine of waiver, the reader may be pardoned for finding the
result somewhat of a standoff, with the Supreme Court's record not too
bad after all, even on the author's own premise.
It must be said that the author's underlying philosophy as to the privi-
lege, here strongly reiterated, does belie this rather meager yield of critical
result. True, he vigorously presses the point that the present interpre-
tation of the privilege is an unnecessary hindrance to law administration;
this he is at pains to state often even if he is not overclear as to the
specific rulings to be reversed or overruled. Another of his points of
stress is that there should be no privilege accorded to public officials or
those holding positions of public trust. Moreover, he attacks sharply
what he considers the opposing philosophy of government and asks for
more specific definitions from judges and writers as to the nature of the
privilege.2 And yet to me the interesting fact is that, notwithstanding
this reiterated belief in the evil effects of current constitutional interpre-
tation, there seems in the end so little of substance upon which courts
so minded could really base a retreat. And they, be it remembered, are
the ones to do the amending!
I realize that in stating what seems to me the failure of the author to
achieve his declared purpose, I am giving an emphasis which may well
be unfair to the book as a whole. For, as I have been at pains to point
out, it constitutes a scholarly and useful disquisition in an important field
of law. But he has invited this evaluating approach, and his ambivalent
position as to the amendment is indeed a matter of some general interest.
It suggests the extreme difficulty of even a convinced critic to make a
frontal attack upon the privilege which will really persuade or satisfy
2 The reviewer is one of those called for such cross-examination because of some
general references he has made to the amendment in opinions and articles. But the
decision of individual cases depends on narrow issues of fact affecting such cases, and
indulgence in further generalities as to the philosophy of government will hardly
prove useful to the author's purpose.
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doubters. And it indicates further that what might be termed the law
review method of a critique of individual cases is more useful as a means
of reform than is an all-out assault on firmly held beliefs in legal princi-
ples now accepted as supporting and protecting individual freedom.
Charles E. Clark*
LEGAL EDUCATION AND PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY. By Julius Stone. Associa-
tion of American Law Schools, West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minne-
sota, 1959. XIII, 430 pages, $5.00.
This book may be considered by some as a report of a series of delibe-
rate conversations carried on by a group of eminent men who somehow
managed to find a station in the stratosphere from which they were able
to look down in Olympian detachment on the world below. To a degree,
this may be so. But, although it may not present many immediately
practical solutions to the problem of professional responsibility, the
account of the Boulder Conference will surely be of ultimate value to
the law, lawyers and society.
As the foreword indicates, concern with the ethical standards of the
profession and, particularly with its attitude toward public responsibility
is no new thing. Indeed, the idea for the conference itself was far from
new. Although Professor Mathews is too modest to say so, it really
originated with him and it was his address as President of the Association
of American Law Schools which first placed the matter before that
group. As President-elect at that time, this reviewer had an opportunity
to participate in the early stages of the project and remembers well the
time, effort and leadership which Professor Mathews contributed.
At any rate, in the fullness of time, some twenty persons gathered at
the University of Colorado in August, 1956, to consider the broad prob-
lem of the education of lawyers for their professional responsibilities.
The group was not confined to legal educators or even lawyers, but
included also clerics and philosophers together with the dean of a
graduate school. A wandering scholar from Australia (Julius Stone) not
only brought to the meeting his very substantial knowledge of Anglo-
American legal systems but also prepared the report. This, no doubt,
was a harrowing experience, confronted as he was with sharply divergent
views presented by highly articulate characters. It seems clear that he
performed his service brilliantly although it was necessary for certain
participants to file separate statements in amplification of their attitudes.
As would be expected, a principal point of discussion had to do with
curricular approaches to the matter. Any group of law teachers will
fall upon a curriculum with all the gusto of a pack of wolves which has
just downed a wounded caribou. There was talk of special courses in
ethics, in responsibility and in decision making. The "pervasive approach"
to the problem was strongly advocated. This means that such matters
* United States Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, 2d Circuit
